I am a Ph.D. student working with Dr. Jim Olson in the Social Area of the Department of Psychology at The University of Western Ontario. I study the psychology of morality and justice—how people think about good and bad, right and wrong, and when (or whether) to help or harm others. My interests encompass the gamut of moral psychology, a field which has exploded over the past decade, but I have focused on three specific areas of inquiry: moral self-judgments, judgments regarding the moral acceptability of different kinds of actions, and moral judgments of other people. As a basic scientist, I focus on the processes underlying moral judgments and behavior, but I also have an interest in applying my work to promote prosocial behavior.
Conway, P. & Gawronski, B. (in press). Deontological versus utilitarian inclinations in moral decision-making: A process dissociation approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
Abstract: Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby’s (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research.
Conway, P., & Peetz, J. (in press). When does feeling moral actually make you a better person? Conceptual abstraction moderates whether past moral deeds motivate consistency or compensatory behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.
Abstract: According to the moral licensing literature, moral self-perceptions induce compensatory behavior: people who feel moral act less prosocial than those who feel immoral. Conversely, work on moral identity indicates that moral self-perceptions motivate behavioral consistency: people who feel moral act more prosocial than those who feel less so. In three studies we reconcile these propositions by demonstrating the moderating role of conceptual abstraction. In Study 1, participants who recalled performing recent (concrete) moral or immoral behavior demonstrated compensatory behavior, whereas participants who considered temporally distant (abstract) moral behavior demonstrated behavioral consistency. Study 2 confirmed that this effect was unique to moral self-perceptions. Study 3 manipulated whether participants recalled moral or immoral actions concretely or abstractly, and replicated the moderation pattern with willingness to donate real money to charity. Together, these findings suggest that concrete moral self-perceptions activate self-regulatory behavior, and abstract moral self-perceptions activate identity concerns.
Hafer, C. L., Conway, P., Cheung, I., Malyk, D., & Olson, J. M. (2012). The relation between identification with a target and the perceived importance of justice. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 34, 395-409. doi:10.1080/01973533.2012.711693.
Olson, J. M., Cheung, I., Conway, P., Hutchison, J., & Hafer, C. L. (2011). Distinguishing two meanings of moral exclusion: Irrelevance of fairness vs. rationalized harm-doing. Social Justice Research, 24, 1-26.
Olson, J. M., Hafer, C. L., Cheung, I., & Conway, P. (2009). Deservingness, the scope of justice, and actions toward others. In A. C. Kay, D. R. Bobocel, M. P. Zanna, & J. M. Olson (Eds.), The psychology of justice and legitimacy: The Ontario symposium (Vol. 11, pp. 125-149). New York: Psychology Press.
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